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Hannken-Illjes has given us a detailed, well-evidenced account of the finding,
developing, and making (or dropping) of two lines of argument in a particular criminal
case. This is just the sort of empirical work on argumentation that has been called for
since the inception of the informal logic movement (Johnson & Blair, 1996 [1980]), and
it demonstrates the challenges of working with full and actual, as opposed to invented or
excerpted, material. Using a methodology which encourages her to rely exclusively on
participants' talk, importing as little of her own understanding as possible, Hannken-Illjes
recounts the developmental history not only of an argument in the "official" trial text, but
also of one in its silences—an argument not made. In this response, I will focus on what
argumentation theorists can learn from this excellent empirical work: about the concept
set necessary to give an account of argumentative practice, and about the limits of the
general theoretical project of argument reconstruction.
Hannken-Illjes relies on three concepts: argument, topos and theme. An argument
is "a fully fleshed" unit of discourse with (I presume) something like a manifest premiseconclusion structure (see Jacobs 2000 for a similar conception). In a German criminal
trial, it is usually the judge who gets to make arguments, in the course of justifying the
verdict. A topos, by contrast, is "a generic concept, a place, that one needs to go to and
fetch arguments[;] . . . not something that can be found and described on the discursive
surface." Among the many sorts of topoi that have been suggested by theorists since
classical times, Hannken-Illjes relies on "material" topoi—the topics commonly raised in
arguments in a particular context, e.g. Motive, Means, Opportunity and Character in a
criminal trial. 1 Finally, "between" topos and argument there lie themes. More determinate
than the abstract topoi, themes "appear on the discursive surface"—they are realized in,
not implicit in, the talk of and around the trial. At the same time, themes are not fully
1

Hannken-Illjes' conception of topoi seems most similar to the Hermagorean system evident e.g. in
Cicero's De inventione or Pseudo-Augustine's De rhetorica. This system encouraged the advocate to select
an overall case strategy by determining the stasis or central issue of a legal case, and then provided him
with a specific set of topical resources useful for carrying out that strategy. Hermagoras also recognized the
same tension Hannken-Illjes emphasizes, drawing a distinction between a thesis or abstract issue (e.g., "Is it
wrong to kill your mother if she killed your father?") and a hypothesis or concrete issue as realized at a
particular place and time, between particular people (e.g., "Is Orestes guilty of murder?"). In fact, the word
"circumstances" is from the Latin translation of Hermagoras' technical term for the factors which move an
issue from abstract to concrete: peristaseis, circumstantiae.
Goodwin, J. (2007). Commentary on Kati Hannken-Illjes: “Building a winning team: The development of
arguments in criminal cases.” In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common
Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-4). Windsor, ON: OSSA.
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realized arguments; they are instead more or less determinate topics which guide
participants in particular situations as they look for, develop and even create support for
arguments they may later make. For example, while Character may be a topos available
in criminal cases, "Kevin's job" is a theme through which that topos is made specific and
effective in the particular case Hannken-Illjes is studying. Themes, in short, are argument
potentials.
Now, argumentation theorists have ordinarily worked with a set of at most two
concepts: the concrete argument, and the topos, or scheme, or other abstract pattern
(including diagram) which specifies the "kind" of argument the argument is. Although
I'm not sure the specific vocabulary of "themes" will play out, I am convinced that
Hannken-Illjes is on the right track in proposing a tripartite concept set, distinguishing
abstract topoi, semi-determinate argument potentials, and fully realized arguments. And
this move from two to three concepts in fact will have large consequences for the theory
of argument reconstruction.
On the optimistic side, Hannken-Illjes' work confirms the sense that there is a lot
of argumentative material out there in the world of discourse. Scholars across the various
disciplines contributing to argumentation theory have proposed that many objects not
manifestly argumentative, like images and advertisements, should be reconstructed as
arguments, at least in some circumstances. As one textbook title puts it, Everything is an
Argument. Hannken-Illjes provides evidence that these scholars are in a sense right: in
this criminal trial, the defense ensemble consistently orients to argumentative potentials
throughout its work. These argument potentials are expressed in all sorts of talk in the
trial process: "the narration of a story, the showing of evidence, notes, highlighted
statements, comments in lawyer–client conferences" (Hannken-Illjes et al. 2007). All
these different forms of manifest talk realize argument themes; they are the makings of
argument.
But there is also a pessimistic side to Hannken-Illjes' tripartite conceptual
scheme—pessimistic, that is, for those who want to reconstruct everything as argument.
One feature of the talk instantiating an argument theme is that it is not an argument. We
recognize argument potential as potential because it is not actual. It would be wrong,
therefore, to reconstruct talk on an argument theme as if it were a fully realized argument.
In particular, such a reconstruction will face two difficulties.
The first difficulty is familiar: in reconstructing a theme as an argument, what is
the reconstructor licensed to put in, what to fill in, and what to leave out? Hannken-Illjes
work documents the large amount of material, e.g. about Kevin's job search, that
apparently doesn't make it into the final "reasons for the verdict." Some of the argument
potential the defense ensemble likely attempts to keep unrevealed for strategic reasons;
other argument potential seems to be known to the judge, but omitted, again presumably
for strategic reasons. How is an argumentation theorist to reconstruct "the argument"
about the Kevin's job from the "mixed mass of evidence" (Wigmore's term; see e.g. 1913)
developed on the theme during the trial process? In practice, the gap between argument
potential and actual, fully realized argument is filled by participants' strategic choices—
by their design. So there is no "the argument" there to be reconstructed until a participant
makes one. 2
2

Hannken-Illjes also faces this difficulty, but in reverse. She rightly resists reconstructing non-argument as
argument in part because doing so involves "normative baggage. This baggage consists among others in the
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The second difficulty facing those who would reconstruct everything, or many
things, as an argument is less well recognized, and more potent. Hannken-Illjes
documents an instance where a theme with well-developed argument potential was not
realized in actual argument at the trial. Kevin's motive of fear is in the course of the trial
preparation supported by his own statements, by independent corroborating witnesses,
and even by some physical evidence. The theme would seem to provide good reasons for
mitigating Kevin's punishment. Nevertheless, no one made a Motive argument at the trial.
We must presume that participants had a reason for their silence. It is possible that the
defense ensemble thought the argument could backfire: if it were rejected as yet another
lie, Kevin's apparent efforts at fabricating evidence would suggest he has a bad character
and is still not cooperating with the authorities, thus justifying a harsher punishment. In
any case, the nonmaking of the motive argument shows that participants are making
strategic choices, not only in the design of the arguments they do make, but in deciding
whether or not to make an argument at all. Arguments, it seems, are viewed by
participants as having a certain force, and sometimes that particular force is not what is
wanted. As Hannken-Illjes notes, in ordinary language, theme-talk is not taken as
argument. "Argumentation," she points out, "is often not a participant category. Rarely
would participants refer to their conversational activities as argumentation." But this
means that reconstructing argument potential as actual argument significantly
misconstrues what participants in a transaction are doing with their talk. In developing an
argument theme, participants are choosing not to make an argument; instead, they are
choosing to engage in other kinds of discourse, with other kinds of force. Reconstructing
argument potential as argument occludes that force.
So what?—one might ask—what is lost if theorists neaten up discourse with
muddled potential for argument, transforming it into what it could be, if actualized? In
addition to a general sentiment of loyalty to talk as it actually occurs, if we paid attention
to what is being said we might find that not making an argument is much more common,
and much more useful, than we have previously imagined. In other work, Hannken-Illjes
(2007) has documented the use of argument themes in testing out potential arguments an
learning from their failure in a safe, behind-the-scenes setting. Scott Jacobs and Mark
Aakhus (2002) have shown that even in third-party mediations, where conditions for
"critical discussion" are as close to ideal as may be achievable in practice, arguments are
not only not made, they are even cut off and reconstructed away by the mediators. At the
notion, that crucial parts of the argument—premises, topoi, themes—stay implicit and are not visible on the
discursive surface," thus requiring the reconstructor to rely on his/her own "normative" sense of a model
argument to fill in the gaps. Note, however, that a researcher can only identify a theme as an argument
theme if he/she perceives the material to be relevant to any one of a number of arguments that could
reasonably be made—arguments that could work in the ways a participant might want an argument to
work. But in large part the researcher must rely on her own intuitions about what these arguments and
workings might be, and how the potential for them appears in discourse . Participants' use of certain terms
(e.g., "fear") is not enough to identify a theme in their discourse, since the terms used in developing an
argument theme may vary and not all uses of a given term may be on the theme. In short, it is probably
impossible for a researcher to avoid importing his/her intuitions into an investigation of argumentative
practice. The advantage of the tripartite conceptual scheme, distinguishing topoi, themes and arguments, is
that it restricts the use of intuition to the realm of the theme, where the argumentative material is admittedly
relatively indeterminate and fluid—"clear and recognizable . . . , yet . . . flexible" and changeable—while
insisting on relying on participants' own talk (including their talk about their talk, their metadiscourse,
Craig 1999) when analyzing their actual arguments.
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same time, in mediations appears that participants make significant efforts to display to
each other argument potential as a sort of threat. Developing an argument theme in
nonargument discourse (e.g., through telling a story, offering an explanation or asserting
a fact) allows the mediation participant to make it manifest that the other side will
"appear unreasonable or blatantly unfair" (43) if he/she does not agree. Beth Manolescu
(2005) has also demonstrated how non-argumentative material, such as presentational
devices and emotional appeals, can do the same work in public oratory: not because they
are arguments, but because they create conditions in which an audience will find it
difficult to be manifestly unreasonable. In these instances, argument potential is like a
nuclear arsennal, creating a space for certain types of negotiations.
In summary, Hannken-Illjes tripartite conceptual scheme, recognizing purely
abstract topoi, fully realized, concrete arguments, and in between argument potential
manifest in themes, in fact presents a significant challenge to theorists who would
reconstruct both potential and actual arguments as arguments. Her exemplary empirical
work thus shows both the "thickness" of the process of developing arguments even in a
relatively minor, uncontested criminal case, and also the complexity of the concepts
needed to deal with that process in a way reasonably loyal to the actual discourse. So I
can end by deploying an academic topos: more work like this is needed!
link to paper
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